Sources
Source register
Footnote numbers across the site refer to the entries below. Each entry states its type, the claims it supports, its verification status and the date it was last accessed. Entries without URLs are deliberately unlinked pending a human check — no URL on this site is invented. Evidence cut-off: July 2026.
[1]
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Article 36 (new weapons)
ICRC treaty database · 1977 · treaty text
Verification: pending human check · accessed 20 July 2026
Supports · The obligation to review new weapons, means and methods of warfare.
ICRC database blocks automated access; URL structure supplied by the editors and pending a human check.
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-36 (external link)
[2]
Ambitious, Safe, Responsible: our approach to the delivery of AI-enabled capability in Defence
UK Ministry of Defence · 2022 · official policy
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · UK policy on context-appropriate human involvement; UK conduct of Article 36 reviews; no intention to develop fully autonomous weapons.
[3]
Proceed with Caution: Artificial Intelligence in Weapon Systems (HL Paper 16)
House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee · 2023 · parliamentary report
Verification: pending human check · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · Parliamentary findings on human control, review and accountability for AI-enabled weapons.
publications.parliament.uk blocks automated access (HTTP 403).
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5804/ldselect/ldaiwe/16/16.pdf (external link)
[4]
Government response to the House of Lords AI in Weapon Systems Committee report
UK Government · 2024 · official policy
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · UK positions on human involvement and iterative Article 36 review of updated systems.
[5]
ICRC position on autonomous weapon systems
International Committee of the Red Cross · 2021 · institutional position
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · The ICRC's recommended prohibitions and constraints; definitional focus on autonomous target selection and engagement.
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-position-autonomous-weapon-systems (external link)
[6]
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles 25 and 28
International Criminal Court · 1998 (2024 ed.) · treaty text
Verification: pending human check · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · ICC jurisdiction over natural persons; modes of individual liability; command responsibility.
icc-cpi.int blocks automated access (HTTP 403).
https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf (external link)
[7]
International Criminal Court Act 2001
UK Parliament (legislation.gov.uk) · 2001 · statute
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · Incorporation of ICC offences into UK law, reaching persons within UK jurisdiction.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/17 (external link)
[8]
Bribery Act 2010, section 7 — failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery
UK Parliament (legislation.gov.uk) · 2010 · statute
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · The structural model cited for a corporate failure-to-prevent offence with a procedures defence.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/7 (external link)
[9]
Export Control Act 2002
UK Parliament (legislation.gov.uk) · 2002 · statute
Verification: verified · accessed 20 July 2026
Supports · The statutory basis for UK controls on export of military goods and transfer of technology.
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/28 (external link)
[10]
Strategic Export Licensing Criteria (written ministerial statement)
UK Parliament / Department for International Trade · December 2021 · official policy statement
Verification: pending human check
Supports · The criteria under which UK export licences are assessed, including clear-risk tests relating to IHL.
parliament.uk blocks automated access; stable URL to be added after a human check.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[11]
UK suspension of certain arms export licences to Israel following an IHL clear-risk assessment
UK Government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office) · September 2024 · state practice / licensing decision
Verification: pending human check
Supports · That UK export licensing has been used to suspend specific licences on IHL-risk grounds. Cited as an example of the licensing lever, not as a finding about any conflict party.
Official announcement URL to be added after a human check; do not conflate suspension, revocation and refusal.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[12]
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights · 2011 · soft-law framework
Verification: pending human check
Supports · Corporate responsibility to respect human rights; due-diligence and remediation expectations. Presented as soft law, not criminal offences.
ohchr.org URL to be added after a human check.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[13]
Responsible Procurement of Military Artificial Intelligence
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) · 2026 · research report
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · That procurement can operationalise legal commitments through documentation, testing and responsibility allocation.
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/0226_milai_procurement.pdf (external link)
[14]
Defining Autonomy: Why Software, Not Drones, Will Decide the Next War
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2026 · research analysis
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · That decision-shaping software, not platforms, is the locus of lethal decision-making; no fielded end-to-end autonomy as of publication.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/defining-autonomy-why-software-not-drones-will-decide-next-war (external link)
[15]
Technological Evolution on the Battlefield
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) · 2025 · research analysis
Verification: verified · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · Documented compression of detection-to-strike cycles and AI-assisted terminal guidance in Ukraine.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chapter-9-technological-evolution-battlefield (external link)
[16]
The Nuremberg industrialist trials (IG Farben; Krupp) — case summaries
US Holocaust Memorial Museum · case summary
Verification: pending human check
Supports · That executives were prosecuted as individuals; the corporate entities were not convicted.
Stable URL to be added after a human check; do not cite a search page.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[17]
Public Prosecutor v. Frans van Anraat — judgment summary
Dutch courts / ICRC national practice database · 2005–2009 · case summary
Verification: pending human check
Supports · That a supplier was convicted of complicity in war crimes on proof of knowledge and contribution.
Stable URL to be added after a human check.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[18]
Sweden v. former Lundin executives (alleged complicity in war crimes)
Swedish Prosecution Authority / Stockholm District Court · ongoing as of July 2026 · case report
Verification: pending human check
Supports · That proceedings against former executives for alleged complicity exist. Not described as a conviction; status must be re-checked before publication.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[19]
Lafarge proceedings — terrorism-financing conviction distinguished from separate complicity litigation
French courts / US Department of Justice · 2022–ongoing · case report
Verification: pending human check
Supports · That corporate liability has been reached through adjacent offences; a terrorism-financing conviction is not a corporate war-crimes conviction.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[20]
Trial Trial — original project documentation
n-Space, Somerset House Studios · 2026 · primary project documentation
Verification: pending legal review
Supports · The description of the simulated trial's method, questions and findings. Participant names, images, quotations and filmed material require permission before publication.
⚠ Stable URL to be added after human verification.
[21]
IAEA safeguards and verification
International Atomic Energy Agency · institutional overview
Verification: pending human check · accessed 17 July 2026
Supports · The declarations-plus-inspections model referenced by the proposed international agency.
iaea.org blocks automated access (HTTP 402).
https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification (external link)